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WRONGS AND RIGHTS IN SUPERTERRANEOUS AIRSPACE:
CAUSBY AND THE COURTS
INTRODUCTION
One of the most salient perplexities to arise in modern property law
has derived from the development and perfection of aviation as a
commonplace mode of transportation. In adjudicating the relative
rights of surface property owners and users of airspace, the courts
have struggled to balance conventional concepts of ownership against
the economic and social needs of a new era. The process has involved
the exhumation and examination of old concepts as well as the postula-
tion of new doctrines. From this synthesis significant decisions continue
to emerge, reflecting a transition in the law, while far-reaching gov-
ernmental regulation has limited the rights of both owners and users.
Evaluation of these decisions, however, reveals serious inadequacies,
many of which are directly assignable to the persistent premise that
airspace is unquestionably a form of real property. It is submitted that
the development of sleek and efficient aircraft has had no jurispru-
dential counterpart, with the result that critical components of the law
in this area reflect the needs of the age of the Jenny, not the jet.
THE COMMON-LAW BASIS
A major maxim of the common law was Coke's oft-quoted phrase'
to the effect that he who owns land owns from the center of the earth
to the heavens. Strictly construed, this doctrine would render any
invasion of airspace superadjacent to one's property a trespass for which
the trespasser would be liable in damages and for which injunctive re-
lief would lie. The obsolesence of this view in an aerospace era is mani-
fest as the courts today recognize. Yet one of the rights presumed to
accompany ownership of land is the freedom to utilize some of the
airspace above it. Another is to be free of unreasonable interference
1. "And lastly, the earth hath in law a great extent upwards, not only of water, as
hath been said, but of air and all other things even up to heaven; for cujus est solum ejus
est usque al coelum, as is holden 14 H.8 fo.12. 22 H.6 59, 10 E.4 14. Registrum origin
and in other books." 1 CoKE UPoN L-rLETON 231 (Thomas ed. 1827).
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with one's enjoyment of the surface itself. With common law tools of
the trade, the courts first sought to resolve this conflict.
The validity of Coke's maxim as applied to higher altitude flights
was attacked and largely discredited in a 1932 case involving the flight
of aircraft from a neighboring airport over the plaintiff's land.' Dis-
avowing the conclusiveness of such maxims, the court recognized never-
theless that flights could still constitute a trespass if they occurred close
to the surface, but concluded that there was much doubt whether a
careful interpretation would show the maxim applicable to higher
altitudes. Substantiation of this conclusion was inferred by the court
from federal legislation which prescribed 500 feet as the minimum flight
altitude for airplanes over uncongested areas.3 An injunction was held
to lie, however, as to all flights below 500 feet over the plaintiff's land,
despite the occasional necessity of such flights in the course of landing
and taking off from the defendant's airport. Foreshadowed was an
idea that was later to become prevalent-that of effective use-in the
court's statement that:
Counsel for the plaintiffs have offered no evidence which would
indicate that flying at 500 feet would interfere with the confort-
able enjoyment of their country estate by the plaintiffs... It may
be that when the practices of the defendants become fixed, it will
be necessary, upon the application of the plaintiffs, to designate a
higher altitude for defendant's flights. The probabilities of the
situation now indicate that the plaintiffs will be amply protected
if the flights of the defendants are made at minimum altitudes of
500 feet.4
Judicial adherence to the purely trespassatory concept was waning,
however, and while injunctions continued to issue for flights below the
2. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corporation, 41 F.2d 929 (D. Ohio 1932). The final
effect of the injunction was to deny defendants the right to operate an airport (55 F.2d
201), since in the natural course of ascent and descent planes must fly at levels below
500 feet.
3. Air Commerce Regulations § 74 (1926). This provision is now found at 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.79 (1967). "Except when necessary for take-off or landing, no person may operate
an aircraft below the following altitudes: (b) Over Congested Areas. Over any con-
gested area of a city, town, or settlement, or over any open air assembly of persons, an
altitude of 1000 feet above the highest obstacle within a horizontal radius of 2000 feet of
the aircraft. (c) Over Other Than Congested Areas. An altitude of 500 feet above
the surface, except over open water or sparsely populated areas. In that case, the air-
craft may not be operated closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle, or structure.
4. 41 F.2d at 942.
1967]
462 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:460
500 foot level,5 attention was refocusing on whether or not actual
damage from low level flights was shown; and if so, whether it was of
substantial severity to justify the injunctive proscription. Thus, as early
as 1930 it was held that while planes landing and taking off from
an adjacent airfield were trespassing when they came within one hun-
dred and five hundred feet of the plaintiff's property, the remedy lay
solely in an award of nominal money damages where no injury to the
property was shown and interference with its use was only slight.0
And it could be stated affirmatively shortly thereafter that:
When it is said that man owns, or may own, to the heavens, that
merely means that no one can acquire a right to the space above
him that will limit him in whatever use he can make of it as a part
of his enjoyment of the land. To this extent his title to the air is
paramount. No other person can acquire any title or exclusive
right to any space above him.
Any use of such air or space by others which is injurious to his
land or which constitutes an actual interference with his posses-
sion or his beneficial use thereof would be a trespass for which
he would have a remedy. But any claim of the landowner beyond
this cannot find a precedent in law, nor support in reason.7
The principle here espoused comports with the later cases in preclud-
ing recovery of damages without proof of injury. An element of tort
law thus displaced one of property, and Coke's maxim 8 became for
the most part an innocuous antiquity.
CAUSBY AND GRIGGS: CoNsTITUTIoNAL LIABILITY
One of the collateral effects of the Second World War was the great
amount of impetus given to aeronautics both qualitatively and quan-
titatively. The potential for controversies arising from the use of air-
space by airplanes was proportionately increased, yet aviation's status
as a strategic element of the defense effort accorded it concomitant
protection; and attempts at enjoining or impeding flight operations all
5. Burnham v. Beverly Airways, Inc., 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E.2d 575 (1942); Maitland v.
Twin City Aviation Corp., 254 Wis. 541, 37 N.W.2d 74 (1949). Injunctive relief is
generally unavailable today as a matter of public policy. See Loma Civic Club v.
American Airlines, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708, 394 P.2d 548 (1964).
6. Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930).
7. Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936).
8. Supra note 1.
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but ceased during the period. The cessation of hostilities, however,
brought the problem to the forefront again, and the fact that in the
postwar period there has been no general disarmament, plus the nature
of military type aircraft, have made the United States a frequent party
defendant in airspace cases. Passage in 1946 of the Federal Tort Claims
Act9 provided a remedy where the theory of the action is injury from
a negligent or wrongful act. But the decision which has attracted the
most attention and has provided the legal foundation for federal air-
space cases for the last two decades is United States v. Causby,10 a case
predating the FTCA. Brought under the Tucker Act of 1877 which ex-
pressly excludes tort liability,'1 Causby stands for the proposition that the
government may be constitutionally liable where it is found that for all
practical purposes land has been "taken" by overflights of aircraft under
its control.
It has been justifiably contended that the extent to which the Causby
decision went in establishing the proposition that aerial activity may
result in a "taking" of property under the fifth amendment 2 has "re-
suilted in a formalism and conceptualism that is giving great trouble
[to the courts] in understanding the respective rights and liabilities
of those engaged in aviation activities and those who own real prop-
erty." 13 Factually the case presents what could be classified as a tort
action,' 4 provided one assumes a duty to refrain from interfering with
another's use of his property. Causby, the proprietor of a chicken farm
situated less than one-half mile from an airport, allegedly suffered
monetary loss and physical discomfort due to the flight of Army air-
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1964). Jurisdiction is granted to the Federal District Courts to
hear actions against the United States for injuries "caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of
his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred."
10. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964). "The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render
judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution,
or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any
express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated
damages in cases not sounding in tort."
12. ..... nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." U.S. CoNsr. amend. V.
13. D. BiLttYou, Am LAw, 52 (2d ed. 1964).
14. A breach of some duty owing the plaintiff, in the absence of a contractual rela-
tionship, the proximate result of which is damaging to him. BLACK'S LAW DicrIoNARY
1660 (4th ed. 1951).
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craft over his property at altitudes as low as 83 feet. The noise and
lights from such flights assertively caused the proprietor and his family
fear and loss of sleep, while many of the chickens were driven by
fright to self-destruction. But while the holding was that these flights
and the resultant damages constituted the compensable taking of an
easement or servitude, the Court failed to make clear whether the tak-
ing was of real property or airspace, or both. It is stated that "the re-
sult was the destruction of the use of the property as a commercial
chicken farm," 15 although "it was only an easement of flight which was
taken." 1' The link between ownership of land and ownership of the
airspace over it was again perpetuated, albeit the invasion of the air-
space was at all times privileged except where it interfered materially
with the enjoyment of the land beneath. Airspace is a "public high-
way," said the Court adding, however, that:
[I]t is obvious that if the landowner is to have full enjoyment
of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate
reaches of the enveloping atmosphere... The landowner owns at
least as much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or
use in connection with the land. See Hinman v. Pacific Air Trans-
port, 84 F.2d 755. The fact that he does not occupy it in a physi-
cal sense-by the erection of buildings and the like-is not material
... While the owner does not in any physical manner occupy
that stratum of airspace or make use of it in the conventional
sense, he does use it in somewhat the same sense that space left be-
tween buildings for the purpose of light and air is used. The
superadjacent airspace at this low altitude is so close to the land
that continuous invasions of it affect the use of the surface of the
land itself. We think that the landowner, as an incident to his
ownership, has a claim to it and that invasions of it are in the same
category as invasions of the surface. 17
Whereas earlier cases had attempted to limit the height of possible
ownership by construing the federal regulations in a manner supporting
preemption of airspace above 500 feet in the name of the public,'8
the prevailing opinion in Causby sought a more flexible standard for
the determination of relative rights, while avoiding any obstacle to
15. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 259 (1946).
16. Id. at 261.
17. Id. at 264.
18. Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corporation, supra note 2. See also Thrasher v.
City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 531, 173 S.E. 817 (1934).
[Vol. 9:460
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future aviation development. Allowance of recovery, however, came
at the expense of reinforcement of a property theory of recovery
which was to prove troublesome in subsequent cases. This aspect was
illuminated by Mr. Justice Black's dissent which noted that the majority
opinion indicated that merely low flight in itself did not constitute a
taking, leaving, consequently, only a tort or nuisance action for the
damages from the noise and glare. 9 In addition, the majority opinion
supports an inference that the Causby doctrine relates to taking
easements of servitudes only where the flight has been directly over
the surface property. Obfuscation of judicial rationale was inevitable.
Causby style liability was extended to state and local governmental
agencies that operate airports in the important case of Griggs v. County
of Allegheny, Pennsylvania,20 even though the agency operated none
of the offending aircraft. Between the two cases, however, a congres-
sional redefinition of navigable airspace had occurred which expanded
the term to include space below 500 feet where it was necessary for
planes to utilize such space in the course of taking off or landing.2'
The federally-approved approach and departure pattern for the Alle-
gheny County Airport caused aircraft to fly regularly at low altitudes
over the Griggs house, the clearance between the bottom of the glide
slope22 and the top of the chimney being a meagre eleven feet. In
bringing suit against the county it was shown that the sound was "com-
parable to the noise of a riveting machine," that window panes shook,
plaster fell out, and sleep was impossible, and that abandonment of
the house had been necessitated.
At issue was the question of whether the redefinition of navigable
airspace precluded a recovery, and if not, whether the county, as
operator of an airport, was liable for a taking where the approach path
had been established under federal regulations, and the aircraft operated
by commercial airlines rather than by the defendant, as in Causby. The
Court again eschewed a preemptive interpretation of the Congressional
declaration, noting that "as we said in the Causby case, the use of land
19. 328 U.S. at 270.
20. 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
21. 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (24) (1964). "Navigable airspace means airspace above the min-
imum altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations issued under this chapter, and shall
include airspace needed to insure safety in take-off and landing of aircraft." For the
current regulations issued under this section see note 3, supra.
22. An imaginary path which extends longitudinally and vertically on an angle from
the runway, the bottom of which increases in height from the ground at approximately
a 30-1 ratio (one foot in height for each thirty in length). Its purpose is to delineate
the course to be followed by aircraft approaching for a landing.
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presupposes the use of some of the airspace above it." 23 An easement
was held to have been taken and the burden of liability placed squarely
on the defendant county for failing to acquire sufficient land for the
operation of its airport.
We think, however, that respondent, which was the promoter,
owner, and lessor of the airport, was in these circumstances the
one who took the air easement in the constitutional sense. Re-
spondent decided, subject to the approval of the C.A.A., where
the airport would be built, what runways it would need, their
direction and length, and what land and navigation easements
would be needed. The Federal Government takes nothing; it is the
local authority which decides to build an airport vel non, and
where it is to be located. We see no difference between its re-
sponsibility for the air easements necessary for operation of the
airport and its responsibility for the land on which the runways
were built.24
The Griggs decision has been described as "eminently correct." 2
Indeed, a logical sustentation of the Causby doctrine would admit of no
other conclusion, and the case may be viewed as in keeping with the
trend of rendering fifth amendment rights applicable to the states via
the fourteenth. Again there had been no contention of tort liability, and
again the implications of airspace being in the public domain were dis-
regarded. Previous state decisions holding local governmental bodies
liable for the taking of air easements in the operation of airports26 were
sanctioned, and the doctrine of a property "taking" given new viability.
It appeared beyond doubt that Causby was indeed the law, as recog-
nized by the altered Restatement view.27 Despite the ramifications of
these cases, however, or perhaps because of them, no adequately compre-
23. Griggs v. County of Allegheny, Pennsylvania, 369 U.S. 84, 88 (1962).
24. Id. at 89.
25. Hill, Liability for Aircraft Noise, 19 MIAMI L. Rxv. 1 (1964).
26. Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash.2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960).
27. RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 159, comment f (1934). "A temporary invasion of the
air space by aircraft, for the purpose of travel through it or other legitimate purpose,
if done in a reasonable manner, and at such a height as is in conformity with legislative
requirements and does not interfere unreasonably with the possessor's enjoyment of the
surface of the earth and the airspace above it, is privileged" RTATEmENT (SEcoND)
(1965) substitutes the following test under § 159: "Flight by aircraft in the airspace
above the land of another is a trespass if, but only if, (a) it enters into the immediate
reaches of the air space next to the land, and (b) it interferes substantially with the
other's use and enjoyment of his land."
[Vol. 9-,460
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ihensive theory of recovery was developed. Rather, the legal legacy of
,Causby-Griggs left much that was neither black nor white; an invitation
for the exercise of inferior court discretion and its converse.
STATE AND FEDERAL REMEDIES
The sometime inequitable character of the easement or servitude con-
cept became readily apparent in Batten v. United States,2 where its
,strict application deprived homeowners of a recovery because the of-
fending flights had not penetrated the airspace exactly above their prop-
.erty. Prior cases had similarly distinguished the "federal rule" in situa-
tions involving non-negligent injuries.O In Batten, jet aircraft on the
"warmup pad of an adjoining Air Force Base produced noise, smoke,
and vibrations of such severity as to merit probable recovery had there
,been an overflight. The use and enjoyment of the property was un-
,questionably impaired, with the dimunition in property values running
as high as 55.3 per cent in some instances.3° Recognizing the existence of
.an injury, the Court nevertheless denied recovery, noting that:
Causby contains nothing indicating that recovery could be had
for noise, vibration, or smoke... The vibrations which cause the
windows and dishes to rattle, the smoke which blows into the
homes.., and the noise which interrupts ordinary home activities
do interfere with the use and enjoyment by the plaintiffs of their
properties. Such interference is not a taking. The damages are no
more than a consequence of the operations of the Base ..." 31
The Court implied, however, that recovery might lie had the plain-
-tiffs been forced to abandon their homes, as had Griggs, or if the action
were characterized other than as one sounding in property.
No amount of sympathy for the vexed landowners can change
the legal principles applicable to their claims. We do not have
either a tort or a nuisance case. The plaintiffs sue under the
Tucker Act and whether the applicability of that Act depends on
a taking without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amend-
28. 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963).
29. E.g., Pope v. United States, 173 F.Supp. 36 (ND. Texas 1959) (denying recovery
for noise, vibration, and fumes from a test cell operated by an adjoining Air Force Base,
although damages awarded for overflight easements); Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 335
Mass..619, 142 NXE.2d 347 (1957) (not allowed for concussion damage due to blasting).
30.. 306 F.2d at 583.
3.1. Id.
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ment or on an implied promise to pay for property taken, the
claims are founded on the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment,
"nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." 32
It is patently clear that one landowner may suffer as much or more
impairment of the use and enjoyment of his land from low flying air-
craft or noise and fumes from an adjacent airport as another landowner,
over a corner of whose property an aircraft wingtip chances to pass.
To permit the latter a recovery, but deprive the former of a remedy,
is to ignore reality. Nevertheless the rule in the federal courts today
in cases alleging a constitutional taking of property is in accord with
Batten,as documenting a major deficiency under Causby.
The Federal Tort Claims Act 4 has not provided an alternate route
to bypass the stringent servitude requirements imposed under Causby
since invasion of airspace is not per se a wrongful or negligent act. In
addition, the FTCA actions are greatly delimited by state substantive
law.33 However, recovery was granted under the FTCA to a plaintiff
who suffered damage to her property from sonic booms created by Gov-
ernment aircraft, but not involving an overflight of her property, in the
somewhat bizarre case of Neber v. United States.30 The requisite negli-
gence under the Act was alleged to be the failure of the United States
to establish a corridor for supersonic flights over a sparsely populated
area rather than over a city, when the former was readily feasible.
The Act's discretionary exemption,37 which had precluded recovery in
32. Id.
33. Accord, Avery v. United States, 330 F.2d 640 (Ct. Cl. 1964); Bellamy v. United
States, 235 F.Supp. 139 (E.D.S.C. 1964); United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in
Kent County, Michigan, 252 F.Supp. 319 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
34. Supra note 9.
35. E.g., Soldinger v. United States, 247 F.Supp. 559 (E.D. Va. 1965). Low flying jet
aircraft from the nearby Norfolk Naval Air Station allegedly caused noise, fright, and
mental anguish, as the result of which property owners suffered extreme nervousness
and high blood pressure. Held: even if negligence could be shown there can be no
recovery under Virginia law for mental anguish unaccompanied by contemporaneous
physical injuries, unless the wrong committed is willful, wanton and vindictive.
36. 265 F.Supp. 210 (D. Minn. 1967).
37. Judicial construction of the Act has inferred legislative intent to protect the
Government from claims that affect the essence of governmental functions. "It excepts
acts of discretion in the performance of governmental functions or duty whether or not
the discretion involved be abused. Not only agencies of government are covered but
all employees exercising discretion." Dalehite v. United States, 246 U.S. 15, 33 (1953).
[Vol. 9:460
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previous cases, 38 was held to have been waived where there was no
reference to it in the answer, the court stating that invocation of the
exemption is an affirmative defense and must be pleaded. While rele-
gated to its facts by the procedural defect, there is evidenced an in-
clination to allow a recovery under a tort theory even to the derogation
of sovereign immunity.
A few decisions also have allowed recovery under the FTCA for
ground damage from aircraft on the basis of state statutes assigning
strict liability to aviation as an ultra-hazardous activity.3 9 This approach
to the problem was extended in a 1965 case to include ground damage
from aircraft noise, alleviating the necessity of alleging and proving
negligence.40 But it would be premature to read into these cases any
major departure from Batten. Actions against state or federal govern-
ments for violation of property rights are generally held insufficient
where invasion of the overhead airspace within the immediate reaches
of the surface and resultant substantial curtailment of the use and en-
joyment of the land are not shown.41
State courts, on the other hand, have been neither bound nor con-
vinced by Batten. It has been sustained, with an admonition that opera-
don of an airport for the public good will be subjected to a less stringent
standard in determining the existence of a nuisance than one operated
for private gain. Conversely, the Batten dissent has received judicial
approval elsewhere.43 The requirement of a physical invasion of the
superadjacent airspace was flatly rejected in Thornburg v. Port of
Portland,44 where noise from jet aircraft departing an adjoining airfield
interfered with enjoyment of property. The planes passed about one
thousand feet to one side of the plaintiffs' land. The court concluded:
We believe the dissenting view in the Batten case presents the
better reasoned analysis of the legal principles involved, and that
38. Huslander v. United States, 234 F.Supp. 1004 (W.D. N.Y. 1964); Schwartz v.
United States, 38 F.R.D. 164 (D. N.D. 1965).
39. United States v. Praylou, 208 F.2d 291 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 934
(1954); Pendergast v. United States, 241 F.2d 687 (4th Cir. 1957); Hahn v. U.S. Airlines,
127 F.Su
. 
951 (E.D. N.Y. 1954).
40. Long v. United States, 241 F.Supp. 286 (D. S.C. 1965). Noted in 8 Wm. & MARY
L. REv. 314 (1966).
41. Cases cited note 33 supra. See also Leavall v. United States, 234 F.Supp. 734
(E.D. S.C. 1964); Schubert v. United States, 246 F.Supp. 170 (S.D. Tex. 1965).
42. Louisville and Jefferson County Air Board v. Porter, 397 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1965).
43. Board of Education of Morristown v. Palmer, 88 N.J. Super. 378, 212 A.2d 564
(1965); City of Atlanta v. Donald, 111 Ga. App. 339, 141 S.E.2d 560 (1965).
44. 233 Or. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962), reaffirmed, 415 P.2d 750 (1966). -
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if the majority view in the Batten case can be defended it must be
defended frankly upon the ground that considerations of public
policy justify the result: i.e., that private rights must yield to pub-
lic convenience in this class of cases. The rationale of the case is
circular. The majority said in effect that there is no taking be-
cause the damages are consequential, and the damages are conse-
quential because there is no taking.4 5
Another state case contra to Batten is Martin v. Port of Seattle,",
which held that no overflight was necessary to maintain an inverse con-
demnation action against the defendant airport owner for an easement
taken by the noise and vibration of low flying jet aircraft. The Supreme
Court of Washington discounted the alleged difference between a "tak-
ing" and a "damaging," a distinction considered critical in the federal
as well as most state jurisdictions. A distinguishable facet of the case in
this respect is the express proscription in the Washington constitution
against either type of interference with property rights without compen-
sation. However, by characterizing all such interference as a "taking,"
actions alleging substantial damage to use and enjoyment of land will
be brought within the purview of the fourteenth amendment. The
basis for the federal rule was not rejected, but the court found that while
both Causby and Griggs involved penetration of overhead airspace,
.* . it is not clear that the reasoning and approach of those cases
is so limited ...The reliance placed upon the high noise level
by the Supreme Court in both decisions, without detectable pre-
occupation with its angle of incidence, strongly indicates that the
holdings are not limited to those instances where the aircraft passes
directly over the land.47
And a Florida court supported an award of damages under circum-
stances similar to those above but in the absence of a constitutional
provision like that of Washington's.8 Characterizing the interference as
an "appropriation," the opinion stressed the moral as well as the legal
obligations of American democracy; that "where the sovereign has a
right to condemn for private use, it will not be permitted to appropriate
except by orderly processes." 49These enlargements of the federal rule
45. 376 P.2d 100, 104.
46. 64 Wash.2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965).
47. Id. at 545.
48. City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So.2d 95 (Fla. 1964).
49. Id. at 103.
[Vol. 9:460
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provide a broader basis for recovery in some state jurisdictions than is
available against the United States. Abandonment of strict concepts of
property ownership in airspace has resulted in a better balancing of in-
terests. Aviation development and use of the public domain remain un-
fettered, but individuals are not deprived of their rights by "a shorter
cut than the constitutional way." 50
APPLICATION TO RELATED PROBLEMS
Collateral issues of significance have raised questions both substantive-
ly and procedurally under the Causby approach. If, for example, there
is a constitutional taking of an air easement over one's property by a
government agency and compensation received therefor, is the existence
of the easement a defense to future actions by the landowner beneath
seeking an additional recovery because the holder of that right is flying
noisier airplanes than previously? And if one's enjoyment of his prop-
erty is in fact contingent on a property interest in the air overhead,
what will be the time limitation on asserting that interest, and at what
point will the running of this limitation be commenced?
The first question was originally answered affirmatively 5l on the
basis that it was within the scope or extent of the easement as created,
52
since the condemning party in the case was a permanent military air-
field and one could normally expect the possibility of larger and louder
planes being utilized in the future, according to the court. The wisdom
of this view was somewhat discredited by a subsequent determination
of when the statute of limitations begins to run. In Klein v. United
States," on a motion for reconsideration, the Court of Claims reversed
its earlier conclusion that the date of the original taking was determina-
tive, and held instead that the cause of action does not accrue until the
extent of the taking of the easement has been ascertained. Allowance
for the unforeseeable was finally made in a 1964 case permitting a sub-
sequent recovery where a subsequent taking from the use of louder air-
50. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
51. Adaman Mutual Water Co. v. United States, 181 F.Supp. 658 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
52. The general rule of real property is that use of an easement will not be found
excessive if it is within the scope of the use permitted by the easement in its creation.
Excessive use does not extinguish the easement, but damages and an injunction may lie.
SMITH, REAL PROPERTY SURVEY 288 (1956). The latter remedy is unavailable against aircraft
flying at federally-assigned altitudes. Loma Civic Club v. American Airlines, supra note
5.
53. 152 Ct. Cl. 221 (1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 936 (1961). See also Davis v. United
States, 295 F.2d 931 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
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craft was shown.5 As a matter of practice, therefore, easements now
often purport to vest in the taker a right to fly aircraft of any kind or
number over tracts of land, but that such terminology will be given
more than evidentiary weight is open to doubt. In conformity with
the property approach, flights lower than the floor of the previously ac-
quired easement will always constitute a new taking where the sub-
stantial interference test is metY
Subsequent takings are not cumulative, and each must be brought
within the applicable statute of limitations.6 Here the property ap-
proach produces the untenable thesis that there may be extensive inter-
ference with use and enjoyment of land without liability for so much
as one penny of compensation provided the magnitude of the offending
element is increased slowly over a period of years, no increase or com-
bination of increases achieving in themselves the level of substantial
interference within the statutory period. While there appears to be no
case directly in point, the implications of Robertson v. United States'7
clearly substantiate this view. In that case it appeared that the property
owners had acquiesced in the Government's taking of an air easement
by failing to contest low level F-86 fighter jet aircraft flights within the
six year period of limitations. When the F-86's were replaced by
noisier F-102's, the property owners were prompted to action. Their
claim was denied, however, on the grounds that the difference between
the noise levels of the two aircraft was insufficient in itself to constitute
a new "substantial interference," the court noting in dead seriousness
that "although there is some evidence to the contrary, the greater
weight of the evidence shows that the noise and disturbance created by
the F-86 and the F-102 on takeoffs is so loud and disturbing that the
human ear can barely distinguish any difference in the intensity of the
sound created by these aircraft when flying over plaintiffs' land at
low altitudes." 'S Similarly, the plaintiff will be precluded from showing
the highest and best use of his land as of the date of the taking as a basis
54. Avery v. United States, 330 F.2d 640 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
55. A. J. Hodges Industries, Inc. v. United States, 355 F.2d 592 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
56. Statutes governing real property actions are not applied. Court of Claims juris-
diction under the Tucker Act provides a six year limitation. 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1964).
Federal Tort Claims actions must be brought within two years. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)
(1964). State remedies are widely varied, ranging from a suit for damages under a tort
claims act (New York) to mandamus compelling institution of condemnation proceed-
ings (Virginia). For a comprehensive compilation of state procedure see MAN-vLKER,
INVERSE CONDEMNATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITs OF PUBLIc RESPONSIBILITY (1964).
57. 352 F.2d 539 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
58. Id. at 542.
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for a determination of damages, where operation of an airport had
previously limited the use of the land to a lessor degree.59
A distinction exists between regulation of property under the police
power and a constitutional taking or damaging under the power of
eminent domain. But regulation may be of such a degree as to constitute
a taking. The Causby test of substantial interference is sometimes ap-
plied by the courts where regulation of rights in airspace under the
police power is at issue.
The prime regulator of airspace over the contiguous United States is,
of course, the Federal Government. The federal regulatory system has
preempted state control over navigable airspace, thus a local ordinance
prohibiting flights below a certain altitude is invalid.60 The regulatory
agency is the Federal Aviation Administration, 1 and the Administrator
is empowered to establish standards to prevent landowners from using
their property in any manner which could be hazardous to flight in
navigable airspace, 2 as well as to protect generally the declared public
right of freedom of transit through it.63 In accordance with this au-
thority, federal "zoning" rules have been promulgated which require the
landowner to notify and receive the approval of the Administrator be-
fore construction in excess of specified heights is undertaken."' Under
Causby it would appear that there is no assertable right against the
Government for the establishment and protection of airways except
where their use interferes substantially with enjoyment of the land be-
neath.
However, zoning which deprives one of practically any feasible use
of his land for the purpose of protecting navigable airspace within an
airport runway approach area has been held unconstitutional as a taking,
although the cases are in conflict as to where the line is to be drawn.
59. Jensen v. United States, 305 F.2d 444 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
60. Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812 (2nd Cir. 1956).
61. Formerly the Federal Aviation Agency. The FAA is now part of the Department
of Transportation.
62. 49 U.S.C. § 1501 (1964).
63. 49 U.S.C. § 1304 (1964).
64. 14 C.F.R. § 77 (1967) et seq. Under present rules, for example, the Administrator
must usually be notified when the construction or alteration is to be more than 200 feet
in height above ground, or any higher than an imaginary line extending upward and
outward from runways a horizontal distance of 20,000 feet, with a climb ratio of one
foot vertically for each 100 feet horizontally. (14 C.F.R. § 77.13). Other sections provide
absolute limits on height of construction ranging from 100 to 1000 feet above ground.
These regulations are complex and assume some understanding of air navigation
terminology.
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Thus, in a 1965 case Causby was cited as authority for the premise that
the reasonable and ordinary use of airspace above land is a property
right which cannot be taken without compensation. 5 Here a toll road
had been constructed at a height of 29 feet above the surrounding sur-
face when the allowable limit under the zoning law was 18 feet. Com-
pensation also has been required where height restrictions confined use of
the land adjacent to an airport to agriculture or single family dwellings. 6
But it has been denied where airport zoning established a building height
of 28 feet.r Recognition of a compensable property interest within the
immediate periphery of superadjacent airspace, then, is at best condi-
tionally relative to aviation airspace requirements; and the Causby
language establishing an enforceable right in so much of the airspace
as can be occupied in use or connection with the land is for the most
part meaningless in this area.
CONCLUSION
The Causby doctrine of analogizing land use interference to con-
denmable property interests in the form of easements or servitudes
through airspace has revealed in the last decade a number of inequities
when applied by the courts. Liability to landowners is too often de-
pendent upon artificial distinctions and overly formalized requirements
which embrace property theories of recovery or ignore them to the
bias of the injured party. Concepts of private ownership in the public
domain are applied which have no analogue in property law. Resultant
decisions are erratic and often unsatisfactory, especially where no cor-
poreal invasion of superadjacent airspace is shown. The burden of pay-
ing for the nation's advancing air transportation system is too often
foisted upon individuals rather than the people.
Approaching is an era of commonplace supersonic air travel which
will compound these deficiencies. While a few state jurisdictions have
developed more realistic bases of recovery under tort and nuisance
theories, the trend remains inchoate. Federal judicial reluctance to
equate an undue quantum of land use restriction with a constitutional
taking under the fifth and fourteenth amendments may require legis-
65. Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Commission, 379 U.S. 487 (1965).
66. Roark v. City of Caldwell, 87 Id. 557, 394 P.2d 641 (1964). But cf. Yara Engineer-
ing Corp. v. Newark, 132 N.J.L. 370, 40 A.2d 559 (1945) (Needs of aviation held an in-
appropriate basis for zoning).
67. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority v. Harrell's Candy Kitchen, U.S. Av. 294
(Fla. 1959). See also United States v. 357.25 Acres of Land, 55 F.Supp. 461 (WV.D. La.
1944).
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lative expansion of the Government's immunity waiver under the Tort
Claims Act. States as well may find themselves able to provide remedial
eligibility under the FTCA through legislative action.
Cognizance that the only property right of real value is one's ability
to use and enjoy his land should force the conclusion that it is this
interest which needs protection. The test is then reduced to "whether
the interference is sufficiently direct, sufficiently peculiar, and of suffi-
cient magnitude to cause us to conclude that fairness and justice, as be-
tween the State and the citizen, requires the burden imposed to be
borne by the public and not by the individual alone." "s
Richard A. Repp
68. Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (loth Cir. 1962) (dissenting opinion).
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